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ST. AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY
OF LAW*
St. Augustine 1 truly stands on the threshold of ancient
and medieval thought. His profound wisdom and learning
as well as his many discriminating insights might indeed be
called that one great funnel through which the philosophical
erudition of antiquity could safely flow into the orbit of
*This paper is the depressing result of repeated but unsuccessful attempts to
review Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel by Huntington Cairns (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. Pp. xv, 357). It is at the same time a candid
admission that it is virtually impossible to discuss adequately, within the frame-
work of the conventional "book review," a lengthy and detailed study of the
various and involved legal theories of some of the most eminent philosophers
of the western world. What Cairns undertakes is in fact nothing less than a
painstaking inquiry into the history of western philosophy, written from the
point of view of the jurisconsult. That Cairns' latest book is a splendid piece
of work will come as no surprise to those conversant with his earlier writings,
such as Law and the Social Sciences and The Theory of Legal Science. It should
be read carefully by all teachers and students of both philosophy and juris-
prudence.
There is, however, one serious shortcoming in Cairns' book, a defect of
omission rather than commission: his failure to dedicate a whole chapter to the
philosophy of law of St. Augustine. Cairns' seven short and casual remarks on
the work of the greatest of all the Church Fathers are somewhat disappointing.
The decisive influence of St. Augustine on the further development of legal
philosophy is a matter of historical knowledge, as is the fact that his many
authoritative statements on law and jurisprudence, although widely dispersed
throughout his many writings, became lasting directives for the whole of medi-
eval legal speculation.
Hence it might be permissible to supply "the missing chapter" of Cairns'
otherwise excellent study, rather than indulge in the petty "fault-finding pro-
cedure" commonly referred to as a "review." While the present writer cannot
match Cairns' inimitable scholarship and firm grasp of the total history of legal
philosophy, it is nevertheless his hope that he may, in a less impressive fashion, fur-
nish some additional positive information of greater usefulness than mere negative
criticism. It is sincerely hoped that Cairns will not regard this attempt as an
expression of presumptuous vanity, but rather as a manifestation of the spirit of
collaboration which is so essential to truly productive scholarship.
1 Cf. Chroust, The Philosophy of Law of St. Augustine, 53 Pmnos. REv.
195 (1944); Chroust, The Philosophy of Law from St. Augustine to St. Thomas
Aquinas, 20 NEw ScHoLscIsm 26 (1946); FosRrN, LE Dorr DE Paop m=x
DANS ST. Auousr " (1906); SC HyLLIo, Dr STAAs- mmw Soz.Ar.mR DES 33.
Auausrnrus (1910); ScHILLING, NATuRREH uND STAAT NACH Da LaMM Dim
AraaN Knzcnn (1914); ScEnILLNG, Die Rechtsphilosophie bel den alien Kirchen-
vaetern in 16 ARCmrv Fum RcnHns- ND WRascHAMrSpinosoPrra I (1922);
HUEBN, UNTERSUCHUNGEN UEBER DAS NATruxurr 3N DER ALTEIRCM1CM0
LITERAu , u.s.w. (1918); TRoELTscn, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen
in 1 GESAMEMTE SCHRFrET (1912); ZEGLER, Geschichte der christlichen Ethik
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Christianity.2 Perhaps his most important contribution to
the history of Christian metaphysics and, hence, that of
legal philosophy, is his interpretation of the ultimate mean-
ing of the Platonic Ideas (OUSIAI). In Plato, as we all
know, the Ideas are autonomous substances, domiciled in a
COSMOS NOETIKOS - an intelligible but inadequately
defined and actually undefinable "realm" of pure and per-
fect existences. With St. Augustine, on the other hand, these
Ideas, so to speak, become transferred into the Divine In-
tellect without, however, being identified with the Divine
Intellect itself.' The classical passage, where St. Augustine
in GESCic=TE DER E mn, 2. Abt. (2d ed. 1892); HALL, HISTORY OF ETHICS
WITHIN ORGANIZED CHRISTIANITY (1910); 2 and 3 DrnaIcR, GESCHICHTE DER
ETHMx (1926); SCHUBERT, Augustins Lex-Aeterna-Lehre in 24 BEarnAxE ZUR
GEscmcHTE DER PmLOSOPIE DiS MITTELALTEEs, No. 2 (1924); SToCKums, Die
Unabaenderlichkeit des natuerlichen Sittengesetzes in der scholastischen Ethik in
FEIuRcER THEor.Ozscnx STUDIEN, Heft 4 (1911); BARnouR, A PHIosoPircA
STUMY OF CHRISTIAN ETHIcs (1911); OFFERGEL-, DIE STAATsEBRE DES HL. AuGus-
TINUs NACH SEINEN SAEmTLICHEN WERKEN (1914); ScHOLZ, GLAUBE UND UN-
GLAUBE IN DER WELTGESCHICHTE, Ene KommxNTAR zu AUGUSTINS Dn CIVITATE
Dm (1911).
2 It should be remembered that the philosophical wisdom of St. Augustine
was not a wisdom of pure speculation or theoretical contemplation of truth.
His was a wisdom primarily born of charity, a wisdom of the sort King Solomon
extolled and which made St. Paul so wise. See Wisdom, chaps. 6-9. It was a
wisdom coming down from the "Father of Lights," Epistle of St. James 1.17,
one of those "best and perfect gifts," ibid., that enlighten the heart and inflame
the will with the knowledge of the grandeur and glory, the charm and beauty,
of all things ordered within the Divine Love. Cf. PHELAN, Somm IImusTRATIONS
or ST. THOmAS' DEVELOPMENT OF THE WISDOM OF ST. AuGus iNF 6 (1946). The
order of thought which becomes manifest in St. Augustine is the order of infused
wisdom, the highest of the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
3 The notion that the Ideas are "thoughts in the mind of the Godhead,"
can already be found in Albinus (c. 150 A.D.), who in his Didascalicus, 6 HER-
M AN, PLATONS WERKE 163, lines 13 and 27 ff. (1851), points out that these
Ideas are "thoughts of the deity." Similar views were held by Philo of Alex-
andria (c. 30 B.C.-45 A.D.) in his De opificio mundi 4; lines 17 ff., 1.4 (Mangey
ed. 1742), 1.5 ff. (Cohn-Wendland ed. 1896); Nicomachus of Gerasa, the Neo-
Pythagorean who lived around 140 A.D., in the foreword to his Introduction
to Arithmetic (ARITHMETIKE ISAGOGE) (Roche ed. 1866); Atticus (c. 175
A.D.), as quoted in Eusebius, Preparatio Evangelica 15.13.1-5; and by the so-
called Neo-Platonists. Cf. PLoNlus, ENNEAns 5.5. The present author believes
that whenever St. Augustine refers to "the Platonists" he does not have in mind
Plato and the members of the Early Academy, but rather the Neo-Patonists
(Plotinus, Ammonius, jamblichus, Porphyry, etc.) and the members of the school
of "Middle Platonism" (Albinus, Gaius, Atticus, etc.).
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expresses this view, is to be found in De diversis quaestioni-
bus LXXXIII, quaestio 46, de ideis 2:4
For the Ideas constitute certain basic forms or principles of
things, and as such are both enduring and immutable. -They
themselves are not formed, and for this very reason they are
eternal and always the same. And these Ideas are contained
in the Divine Intellect. Since they are neither generated nor
subject to corruption, we hold that all that which potentially
might be generated and corrupted as well as all that which is
actually generated and corrupted, is formed after them.
Perhaps even more important is St. Augustine's statement
in Retractationes 1.3.2, where he says:'
Plato did not err when he stated that there exists an intel-
ligible world, although as regards this matter he did not em-
ploy a term commonly used in the tradition of the Church...
He called this intelligible world the eternal and immutable
reason itself, through which God created the universe.
This novel interpretation of the nature and "location" of
the Platonic Ideas, that is to say, of the constant and im-
mutable principles or forms of all things created, also de-
termines decisively his attitude toward the basic problem of
law and legal philosophy. Heraclitus of Ephesus,' Pytha-
goras,7 Plato,8 and Aristotle I had always maintained the ab-
4 40 MIGN, PATROLoGIA LATINA [hereinafter P.L.], col. 30: "Sunt namque
ideae principales formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommu-
tabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem
modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligentia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque
oriantur, neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod orhi
et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit."
5 32 P.L., col. 588: "Nec Plato quidem in hoc erravit, quia esse mundum
intelligibilem dixit, si non vocabulum quod ecclesiasticae consuetudini in re ila
non usitatum est, sed ipsam rem velimus attendere. Mundum quippe ile intelli-
gibilem nuncupavit ipsam rationem sempiternam atque incommutabilem, qua
fecit Deus mundum." St. Augustine actually refers here to the LOGOS (ratio)
and the COSMOS NOETICOS (mundus intelligibiis) of the Neo-Platonists. Cf.
De civitate Dei 10.3.1; 41 P.L, col. 280.
6 Diets, DiE FRAGwtENTB DER VORSOxRATixER, Frags. 112, 114, 431, 108
(4th ed. 1922).
7 AResTOTLE, Mr.Apxsics 1.6, 987 b 11.
8 PxaBnus 22 C; REuBr c 508 E ff.; CRATYLus 439 C; LAws 716 C;
Lysrs 219 C-220 B; GORGY S 483 E; PHABDRus 247 P; PxHxDO 65 D, 66 A;
PA Em. Er s 130 B; REPunLIc 517 C, 511 B, 501 B.
9 Dz ANItA 3.5, 430 a 23 if.; MEtApn 'iscs 12.7, 1072 b 25 if.; 6.1, 1026 a
19; 13.10, 1086 b 13 if.; 11.3, 1060 b 31 if.; 14.4, 1091 a 32 f.; Nico -.acE
ETHcs 1.4, 1096 a 19 f.; 5.10, 1194 b-1195 a. Cf. JAEGER, AMrToTEIrs 230
note, 136 (1924).
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solute transcendency of the LOGOS, NOUS, or Divine (cos-
mic) Intellect. The Stoics, on the other hand, in their essen-
tially naturalistic or materialistic conviction, had insisted
that this "Intellect" or LOGOS is immanent to the world.
In other words, according to Stoic teachings, this LOGOS
is dispersed throughout the universe and as such signifies an
essentially impersonal, vitalistic and naturalistic principle.10
The individual, as well as every individual thing, is thus a
"part" of this universal cosmic reason - a mode by which
the LOGOS becomes manifest. 1 Needless to say, aside from
its materialistic or naturalistic aspects, this view proclaims
a definitely pantheistic philosophy. In compliance with this
fundamental view, the Stoics proclaimed that the complete
submission to the cosmic reason constitutes the first moral
principle, which finds expression in the often reiterated
postulate: "to -live according to nature." 12 According to the
Stoics, the cosmic reason or LOGOS is not only the lex
aeterna and nature, but also God Himself. In this fashion
the Stoics actually identified the impersonal cosmic reason
with the lex aeterna, the lex aeterna with nature, and na-
ture with God.3
10 Cf. BONHOEFBER, DIE ETHi DES SToIxERs EPIXTE", App. V (1894).
11 Cf. 1 ARNIm, SToicoRum VETERuM FRAGmENTA; nos. 1046, 1022 (1903).
12 1 Id., no. 527. The Stoic precept, "to live according to nature," also
means to live according to one's own (human) nature. For one's own nature is
merely a "part" of universal nature, and one's own reason only a manifestation
of the universal cosmic reason which, as an impersonal cosmic principle, is one
and the same with the individual and the universe. Hence Stoicism is actually
a form of pantheism in that the cosmic reason is identified with God, God with
nature, and nature with the individual.
13 To the Stoics, the foundation of all which might be called law is the
moral spirit, which is part and parcel of the universal and, hence, rational
cosmic order. By virtue of their belief in the consubstantiality of man's nature
with the universal (divine) nature, the Stoics identified moral and physical
principles, that is to say, the moral and the physical order. This also explains
why morality is, with the Stoics, nothing else than complete harmony with
nature. "Nature," however, had for the Stoics a twofold significance. Cf.
DIOGENES LAERTIUs 7.87. It means, on the one hand, the HEGEMONIKON,
the eternal, immutable, and sublimely rational necessity in the administration
of everything that exists or moves. But since the Stoics designated this HEGE-
MONIKON also as the supreme deity, "living according to nature" to them sig-
nifies, on the other hand, morality, and morality submission to the decrees or
commands of the Godhead. In other words, morality means submission to nature
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In objecting to this type of pantheistic materialism, St.
Augustine made his second most important contribution to
Christian metaphysics and legal philosophy. And this con-
tribution, which consists in a radical reformulation of the
actual meaning of the Stoic cosmic reason or LOGOS, is
fully in accord with his basic re-interpretation of the Platon-
ic Ideas and, as a matter of fact, merely the cogent result of
this re-interpretation. Already the early Greek philosophers
and poets had spoken of an unwritten highest law of divine
origin and divine nature. This law was regarded as being co-
extensive with the "eternal order of things" decreed by the
Godhead. Thus Heraclitus of Ephesus, for instance, had in-
sisted that "all human laws derive their substance from that
one law which is of God." '" The Pythagoreans considered
the universal harmony, based on mathematical proportions,
to be the true order of things and, hence, the eternal or di-
vine law.'" Plato and Aristotle, the latter in a more indirect
manner,' 6 were convinced of the existence as well as the
as well as to the divine law which also contains the divinely ordained purpose of
the universe as decreed by Divine Providence.
In this manner the Stoic lex naturalis actually became the lex aeterna, an
equivocation which had tremendous consequences for the subsequent develop-
ment of the history of Natural Law theories. Cf. Chroust, The Function of Law
and Justice in the Ancient World and the Middle Ages, 7 JoMRAL oF ME
HtoRy oP IDEAS 305 (1946).
14 Dims, op. cit. supra note 6, Frag. 114, (chap. 12 A 1).
15 Id., Frag. 10. Cf. ApisToLE, MnrAPnvsics 1.5, 958 b 23 ff.; 13.3,
1090 a 3 ff.; 13.3, 1090 a 20 if.
16 When discussing the Natural Law of Aristotle, most scholars limit their
investigations to the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle
apparently speaks of a "Natural Law" and a "positive law." Thus it has fre-
quently been assumed that Aristotle considers the "law of the polis" (DIKAION
POLITIKON) the "Natural Law," because this "political law" is subdivided into
a "natural" (PHYSIKON) and a "positive" (NOMIMON) law. But what
Aristotle had actually in mind here is the fact that the "law of the polis" has
an apriori (PHYSIKON) and an aposteriori (NOMIMON) element. Hence,
when discussing Aristotle's idea of a "higher law," we cannot limit ourselves
merely to an analysis, of the Nicomachean Ethics. For what Aristotle considers
here is essentially nothing else than the practical application of this "higher law."
His notion of the "higher law" is dispersed throughout his philosophical writings,
and is presupposed, but not actually mentioned in the Nicornachean Ethics. Cf.
JAEGER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 274, 86, 230, 228 ff., 250 ff., 254 ff. Of par-
ticular interest here are the Metaphysics 1091 a 30 if., the Protrepticus, and
On Philosophy, as well as those parts of Aristotle's writings which are referred
to by Jaeger as "Urmetaphysik," "Urethik," and "Urpolitik."
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necessity of such an eternal law. The Stoics in particular
always referred to the "eternal cosmic law," which with
them was identical with eternal reason."1 But with the Stoics,
as has already been pointed out, this cosmic reason or ex
aeterna signified a totally impersonal "force," a kind of
vitalistic energy which not only permeates the universe, but
actually constitutes this universe both in its whollist as well
as its particular aspects.
St. Augustine fully realized both the advantages and dis-
advantages of the Stoic notion of the lex aeterna. The idea
of a sublimely rational orderliness pervading the universe
could not fail'to appeal to him, but he was at the same time
conscious of the dangers inherent in any attempt to identify
this lex aeterna or this order with God Himself. Hence he
proceeded to give the Stoic cosmic reason or lex aeterna a
personalistic and theistic foundation by declaring it an act
of God. Thus he stated quite emphatically that "the Divine
Wisdom is the universal law." 18
To understand and appreciate the profounder meaning
of St. Augustine's "universal law," we must above all realize
that to him "law" and "order" are two correlated and fre-
quently synonymous terms. By "order" he means primarily
that basic norm or standard according to which all created
things act.'" But "order" signifies also the internal harmony
and "peace" which exist among Al creatures, from the high-
17 Cf., among others, MARcus Auaar~us, 2.3, 4.40, 5.32, 12.30, 9.28, 2.13,
2.16, 2.17, 3.16, 5.27, 9.1, etc.; 1 AmNrs, op. cit. supra note 11, nos. 179-82, 552-
56; 3 id., no. 12, 2-28; no. 16, 57-59; CLEmENT OF ALEXANDRIA; STROmATA, 2.22.133,
2.186.19 ff.; CICERO, AcAD. PRIOR. 2.186.131; SENECA, EPISTOLA 20.5; DE BEATA
VITA 8.2.
18 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaestio 79.1, 40 P.L., col. 90: "Est
enim lex universitatis Divina sapientia."
19 De ordine 1.10.28, 32 PJ1., col. 991: "Ordo est. . . per quem aguntur
omnia quae Deus constituit." Cf. CICERO, DE NATURA DEORUm 2.38.97, 2.40.101;
DE DIVINATIONE 1.57.127; ACAD. PosT. 1.7.29; DE oncns 1.4.14, 1.40.142-44.
There can be no doubt that St. Augustine was well acquainted with the works
of Cicero, particularly his-philosophical works. Thus he himself admits in Ccm-
fessions 3.4.7, that Cicero's Hortensius aroused in him a deep interest in phil-
osophy. See also 46 P.L., col. 165 (sub titulo "Cicero"), where the quotations
from Cicero in the works of St. Augustine are listed.
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est to the lowest. All creatures aspire to this peace which
essentially is nothing else than "the tranquility of orderli-
ness." 20 Orderliness, on the other hand, signifies the har-
monious interaction of every part in its relation to the
whole, in which each created thing assumes its proper, that
is, divinely ordained place.21 Obviously, St. Augustine refers
here to "the inner natural order" to which all things are
subjected.22 But the term "order" is also used in a moral
sense. Thus St. Augustine says: "This is not the proper or-
der, nay, cannot be called order at all, when that which is
superior should be subordinate to that which is inferior." 23
Again in another place he makes it quite clear that "the ra-
tional soul acts morally only when it observes the universal
order - when in all its distinctions, choices and evaluations
it subordinates the lesser to the greater; the corporeal to the
spiritual; the inferior to the superior; and the temporal to
the eternal." 24 Thus it is the observance of this universal
order which constitutes the road to God.25 An "orderly
conduct," according to St. Augustine, is a conduct, there-
fore, which conforms to 'this fundamental norm, which in-
cludes the basic moral norms and precepts.
We have already noted that St. Augustine, followibg in
the footsteps of the best of classical tradition, frequently re-
20 De civilate Dei 19.13.1, 41 P.1., col. 640: "Pax omnium rerum est
tranquillitas ordinis. Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tri-
buens dispositio" Cf. CicEo, Da omcirs 1A.144: "Nam et ordinem definiunt
Stoici compositionum rerum aptis et accommodatis locis ..
21 Cf. note 20 supra.
22 It should be noted here that St. Augustine frequently relates the concept
of order to that of beauty. Cf. De vera religione 30.56, 34 P.L., col. 146-47;
De vera religione 43.80, 34 P.1., col. 159: ". . . ordinata convenientia pulchra
iudicetur." De vera religiane 40.76, 34 P.1., col. 156: "Ita ordinantur omnia
officiis et finibus suis in pulchritudinem universitatis, ut quod horremus in parte,
si cum consideremus, plurimum placeat." De civitate Dei 19.13.1, 41 P.., col.
640.
23 De libero arbitrio 1.8.18, 32 P.L, col. 1231: "Non enim ordo rectus, aut
ordo appellandus est omnino, ubi deterioribus meliora subiiciuntur."
24 Epistola 140, 2.4, 33 P.L., col. 539: "Ita bene agit in his anima rationalis,
si ordinem servet et distinguendo, eligendo, pendendo subdat minora maioribus,
corporalia spiritualibus, inferiora superioribus, temporalia sempiternis."
25 De ordine 1.9.27, 32 P.L., col. 990: "Ordo est quem si tenuerimus in
vita, perducet ad Deum."
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gards "order" and "law" as two synonymous terms. He de-
duces the meaning of the term lex (law) from legere (to
read) or elegere (to select).26 But lex signifies also "the se-
lection of the just." Although St. Augustine clearly distin-
guishes between the temporal or human law and the eternal
law,"' whenever he refers to law (lex) in general, he has
usually in mind the lex aeterna. Thus he queries his friend
Evodius:28
What law is it, which is called the supreme reason; which
must always be obeyed; through which evil men merit the
miserable and just men the beatific life; and by virtue of
which that law which we have defined as the temporal law,
can be issued as well as modified properly?
And Evodius replies: "Obviously, this is the lex aeterna."
St. Augustine then goes on defining the lex aeterna: "The
lex aeterna... is that law which justifies, or is at the bot-
tom of, the most perfect orderliness." 29 In other words, the
lex aeterna is the inner justification for the inner order of
all things. This eternal justification or order itself is nothing
26 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 3.20, 34 P.L., col. 681: "Unde etiam legem
a legendo, id est eligendo latini auctores appellatum esse dixerunt." This passage
obviously refers to CicERo, Da LGmus 2.5: "Ut perspicuum esse possit in ipso
nomine legis interpretando inesse vim et sententiam iusti legend" St. Thomas
Aquinas, on the other hand, states, um:SA TH~oLGicA I.II, quaest. 90, art. 1,
that "lex is derived from ligare (to bind), because it binds one to act." But
he also says, id., art. 4, ad 3, that "lex is derived from legere (to read)." Cf.
IsmoaE oF Svman, E-T-YoLooriA 3.2.3; Cod. Borgh. 139 (saec. XIII) of the Vatican
Library, folio 97 et seq. This work contains an anonymous treatise on the nature
of the lex aeterna and the lex naturalis. Cf. Chroust, The Philosophy of Law
from St. Augustine to St. Thomas Aquinas, 20 Naw ScoAsarcisx 50 (1946).
In this treatise the anonymous author, who is definitely influenced by St.
Augustine, states that the term lex is not derived from either legere or ligare,
but is rather a combination of both these words: "quia ligat per electionem."
27 De libero arbitrio 1.6.14-15, 32 P.L., col. 1228-9; id. at 1.15.31-32, 32 P.L.,
col. 1237-8. Cf. Cicaao, DE Lnomus 2.5.11: "Quae leges autem ad tempus descriptae
sunt populis... divina mens summa lex est."
28 De libero arbitrio 1.6.14, 32 P.L., col. 1229: "Quid? illa lex quae summa
ratio nominatur, cui semper obtemperandum est, per quam mall miseram, boni
beatam vitam merentur, per quam denique illam quam temporalem vocandam
diximus, recte fertur, recteque mutatur . . . ? Evodius inquit: video hanc
aeternam [sil., legem] esse."
29 De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229: "Ut igitur breviter aeternae
legis'notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est
qua iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima." Cf. Cicro, AcAD. PRIoR. 1.7.29;
DE oncUs 1.4.14; DE NATURA DEoaum 2.38.97.
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else than the Divine Wisdom 0 or the Divine Intellect, 31 and
thus St. Augustine calls the lex aeterna "the Divine Intel-
lect and the Will of God which commands us to observe the
natural order, and forbids us to disturb it." 82 In this sense,
and in this only, the lex aeterna is the most sublime reason
itself.3 Thus not only the absolute necessity as well as the
reason of all that exists or moves, but also the absolute jus-
tification for the orderliness and harmony in which every-
thing exists and moves, rests in the will and wisdom (in-
tellect) of a personal God. It is the Divine Wisdom (Intel-
lect) and the Divine Will which not only-created, but also
maintains both the natural and moral order. 4 This order,
which in its sublime rationality is both eternal and im-
mutable, has the nature of a law - of a law, that is to say,
which likewise must be eternal and, being the manifesta-
tion of the ratio divina, declaratory of unchangeable truths. 5
This is the lex aeterna "which is called the supreme reason
30 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaestio 79.1, 40 P.L., col. 90: "Est
enim lex universitatis divina sapientia."
31 Ibid. Cf. Enarrato, in Psalmum 36, sermo 3, 36 P.L., col. 383-95.
32 Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22.27, 42 P.1., col. 418: "Lex vero aeterna
est ratio divina vel volhntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari iubens, pertur-
ban vetans." Id. at 22.30, 42 P.L., col. 420; id. at 22.61, 42 P.L., col. 438;
id. at 22.73, 42 P.1., col. 446. Cf. CiCERO, Pn=wPIcA 10.12.18: "Est enim lex
nihil alium . . . imperans honesta, et prohibens contraria." DE LEGmus 2.4.8:
"... legem neque hominis ingeniis excogitatam, nec scitum aliquod esse popu-
lorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quad universum mundum regeret imperandi pro-
hibendique sapientiae." Id. at 2.4.10: ". .. lex vera atque princeps apta ad
iubendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Jovis." Id. at 1.6.18: "Lex est
ratio summa, insita in natura, quae Wubet ea quae fadenda sunt, prohibetcjue
contraria." DE REPUBLICA 3.22.
33 De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229: "Quid? Ma lex quae summa
ratio nominatur . . . ?" Cf. CicERo, DE LEGIrBUs 1.6.18; 2.4.18; 2.5: "Divina
mena summa lex est."
34 It should be noted here that, unlike the Stoics, St. Augustine does not
hold that God Himself is this order, but merely the absolute justification for
the existence of this order. Hence it is God's will or God's intellect which is
the basis of the natural and moral order. Since this is so, both the natural
and moral orders are in their sublimity eternal, immutable, and rational. Thus,
barring one isolated instance, De vera religione 31.57, 34 P.L., col. 147: "Deus
summa ista lex est . . . ," St. Augustine, unlike the Stoics, never identifies God
with the lex aeterna. For the Stoics, see 1 AmNr, op. cit. supra note 11, no. 527.
35 De vera religione 31.57, 34 P.L., col. 147.
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or principle.., and through which all that we may call tem-
poral law, is done and modified in the proper manner." 3
By defining the lex aeterna as "the Divine Intellect and
the Will of God," St. Augustine touches upon the dual
"aspect" of the lex aeterna. He calls it, on the one hand, the
supreme reason (Divine Intellect) and the wisdom of God.
It is safe to assume that he refers here to the fact that the
lex aeterna is "in" the Divine Intellect as the foremost ex-
emplar of order, harmony, and normativity. It is, in other
words, God's understanding of how creation must be or-
dered, and of how it is to be led to its proper end through
this order. On the other hand, he designates it as the Will
of God, thus implying that the lex aeterna is declaratory of
the divine intent or resolve to bind forever all of His crea-
tion to this constant order devised by the Divine Intellect.
Hence it might be said that the lex aeterna, according to St.
Augustine, constitutes both the "ideal" and the realized
plan or resolve of God as regards His creation.
St. Augustine's theistic definition of the lex aeterna be-
came the basic concept as well as the authoritative pro-
nouncement for the whole of medieval jurisprudence. 7 It
was fully adopted, though further elaborated, by St. Thomas
Aquinas, 8 whose treatise on law must be considered the first
36 De libero arbitrio 1.6.14, 32 P.L., col. 1229. Cf. note 28 supra.
37 Cf. Chroust, The Philosophy of Laso from St. Augustine to St. Thomas
Aquinas, 20 NEw SCHOLASTICISM 26 (1946).
38 St. Thomas Aquinas quotes St. Augustine's definition of the lex aeterna,
SumssA THEOLOGICA 1.11, quaest. 91, art. 1: "On the contrary, Augustine says:
that law which is the supreme reason cannot be understood otherwise than
unchangeable and eternal." This quotation refers to De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32
PJL., col. 1229; SummA THwo-oxoscA .11, quaest. 91, art. 2, obj. 1: "The eternal
law is that law by which it is right that all things should be most orderly."
This quotation refers to De libero arbitrio, loc. cit. supra. The same quotation
appears in SummA THE OOGiCA ., quaest. 91, art. 3, obj. 1; quaest. 93, art 4;
quaest. 93, art. 1; quaest. 93, art. 2, which also refers to De vera religione 31.57,
34 P.L., col 147; and in SumrA THEoLoGIcA I.II, quaest. 93, art. 3, obj. 3.
(In his reply St. Thomas also refers to De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col.
1228). SuznLA THEoLOGICA 1.11, quaest. 93, art. 4, ad 2, refers to De vera
religione 31.57, 34 P.I., col. 147, while Su7ArA THEoLoGicA I.1I, quaest. 93, art. 6,
obj. 3 refers to De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 FL.., col. 1228, and De civitate Dei
19.12, 41 P.L., col. 640. Cf. SUMMA nIT oLO OICA 1.11, quaest. 106, art. 2, ad 3;
quaest. 102, art. 1, obj. 2.
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truly systematic and comprehensive treatment of the funda-
mental problems of legal philosophy undertaken by the
Middle Ages. 9
After having defined the lex aeterna, St. Augustine pro-
ceeds to describe certain of its attributes. First of all, it is
eternal. Thus in the De libero arbitrio, he asks'his friend
Evodius "whether or not this law [the lex aeterna] must ap-
pear to any intelligent person as being eternal and immuta-
ble?" And Evodius replies without hesitation: "I consider
this law to be both eterna:l and immutable." 40 In the De
ordine, St. Augustine refers to an eternal and ineffable law
- the lex aeterna - which applies even to sinners and ev'l
men. 1 Aside from being eternal, the lex aeterna is also im-
39 The high esteem in which the philosophy of law of St. Thomas Aquinas
has been held even by modern non-Catholic scholars might be gathered from
the following, 2 JHERiNG, DER Zwzcx i- REHT 161 et seq. (3d ed. 1902):
"This great mind [St. Thomas] correctly understood the realistic, practical and
historical facts of moral life. .. In amazement I ask myself how is it possible
that such truths, once they were uttered, could be forgotten so completely by
our Protestant scholars? What false roads would have been avoided, had they
taken these truths to heart. For my part, I would probably never have written
my book [Der Zweck im Recht] had I known these truths. For the basic ideas
I have occupied myself with are to be found in that gigantic thinker in perfect
dearness and most pregnant formulation."
Kbhler, in his LEHEBucH DER R cHTsPHinosoPmz 38 (3d ed. 1923), remarks
that "it is the immortal achievement of St. Thomas Aquinas... to have formu-
lated the problem of natural law in a manner which is closest to truth." After
having referred to the secular Natural Law tradition which followed in the wake
of Grotius, Kohler exclaims, id. at 43: "How much wiser and profounder were
the ideas of St. Thomas." The same Kohler, HoLTzENoar-Kon=, ENzYxro-
PAEDiE DER RECHTSwxSsENScHA:T 1.3 (7th ed. 1906), points out that "scholastic
thought, particularly St. Thomas . . . constitutes the acme of jurisprudential
discussion. .. ." Jerome Frank, in the foreword to the sixth edition of Law
and the Modern Mind, states on page xvii: "I do not understand how any
decent man today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modern civilization,
the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to human conduct, as stated
by Thomas Aquinas." When, on the other hand, Professor Barrett asserts that
Blackstone probably had read carefully St. Thomas' treatise on law, he is cer-
tainly embarking upon plain fiction. Barrett, Confession and Avoidance?7-Reflec-
tions on Re-reading Judge Frank's Law and the Modern Mind, 24 Nomam DAME
LAwYER 447, 458 (1949).
40 De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229: "Evodius inquit: Video
hanc [sci., legem] aeternam esse et immutabilem."
41 De ordine 2.14.11, 32 P.L., col. 1000: "Namque omnis vita stultorum,
quamvis per eos ipsos minime constant minimeque ordinata sit, per divinam tamen
providentiam necessario rerum ordine includitur, et quasi quibusdam locis ila
ineffabili et sempiterna lege dispositis, nullo modo esse sinitur, ubi esse non
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mutable in that it "remains unchangeable and thus guides
all that is changeable by a most sublime government." 42
Again in the De vera religione he points out that ". . . the
measure of order lives in the eternal truth; it is disturbed
neither by the masses nor by the course of temporal events.
For as a power it rises greatly above all space, and in its
timelessness it stands immovably above all times." "
The lex aeterna, however, is not merely eternal and im-
mutable, but also all-encompassing. It governs all of creation
without exception, and every creature is subject to it. For
nothing can possibly remain outside the lex aeterna and the
universal order " for which it stands: "Because the all-
highest God governs everything which He Himself has
created so excellently, there cannot b! anything disorderly
or lawless in the universe, whether we know this or not." 45
Essentially the same idea we find expressed once more in
the De civitate Dei, where St. Augustine states: "In no man-
ner can anything be kept outside the laws imposed by the
all-highest Creator and Administrator, through Whom the
peace and order of the universe is being administered." 46
Finally, in his Contra Faustum Manichaeum, St. Augustine
debet." Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22.27, 42 P.L., col. 419: "Nos vero
secundum aeternam legem ... iuste vivimus, si vivamus ex fide non ficta." Cf.
CICERO, DE REPUBLICA 3.22; DE NATURA DEORUM 1.15; DR LEGiSUs 2.4.8; 2.4.10.
42 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaestio 27, 40 PJ1., col. 18:
. . cum lex ipsa immutabilis maneat, et omnia mutabilia pulcherrima guber-
natione moderetur." Cf. De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229, quoted in
note 40 supra. Cf. CicERo, DE REPUBLiCA 3.22.
43 De vera religione 43.81, 34 P.L., col. 159: "Ipse autem ordinis modus vivit
in veritate perpetua, nec mole vastus, nec protractione volubills; sed potentia
supra omnes locos magnus, aeternitate supra omnia tempora immobilis."
44 De ordine 2.7.21, 32 P.L., col. 1004: "Nam ordinem esse dixisti quo Deus
agit omnia. Nihil autem, ut video, non agit Deus: nam inde visum tibi est,
nihil pmeter ordinem posse inveniri." Cf. CICERO, DE NATURA DEORUm 2.30.75.
45 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaest. 27, 40 P.L., col. 18: "Summo
enim Deo cuncta bene administrante quae fecit, nihil inordinatum in universo,
nihilque iniustum est, sive scientibus sive nescientibus nobis."
46 De civitate Dei 19.12.3, 41 P.L., col. 640: "Nullo modo tamen inde
aliquid legibus summi illius Creatoris Ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a quo pax
universitatis administratur." Cf. De ordine 1.4.11, 32 P.L., col. 983: ". . . sere-
nissime intuenti [scl., clarum est] nihil fieri sine causa . . . nihil fieri nisi certo
causarum ordine. .... "
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once more makes it quite clear that everything created is
under the sway of the lex aeterna: 47
The beastly nature does not sin, because it does not act con-
trary to the lex aeterna, to which it is subjected in a manner
which makes it impossible for this beastly nature to partici-
pate spiritually in this lex aeterna. Likewise the sublime
angelic nature does not sin, because it partakes of the lex
aeterna in such a fashion that God alone becomes its joy, and
thus this angelic nature abides by God's will without experi-
encing any temptation whatsoever . . . Man, however, must
subject to his rational control what he has in common with
animals, and subject to God what he has in common with the
angels, until after having achieved moral perfection and im-
mortality, he rises above the animals and attains the level
of the angels.
In this manner the lex aeterna determines all creatures. The
non-rational creatures as well as the rational creatures are
subjected to it, the former without being conscious of this
subjection. Evil too, St. Augustine opines, is subjected to
the lex aeterna:48
I do not believe that anything could happen outside the
universal order of things. Evil itself, since it was somehow
generated, did not originate through God's ordination. But
justice would not admit that evil should remain outside the
universal order of things, and hence forced and relegated it
to its proper place.
According to St. Augustine, evil and sin are conscious de-
fection from the universal order and the lex aeterna 49 un-
47 Contra Faustum Manichaeurn 22.28, 42 P.L., col. 419: "Bestialis enim
natura non peccat, quia nihil facit contra aeternam legem, cui sic subdita est,
ut eius particeps esse non possit. Rursus angelica sublimis natura non peccat,
quia ita particeps est legis aeternae, ut solus earn delectet Deus, cuius voluntati
sine ullo experinento tentationis obtemperat. Homo autem . . . subdat sibi
quod habet commune cum bestiis; subdat Deo quod habet commune cum
Angelis: donec iustitia et immortalitate perfecta atque percepta, ab istis exaltetur,
illis aequetur." Cf. CICERO, DE orricus 1.4.14.
48 De ordine 2.7.23, 32 PJ1., col. 1005: "... non puto nihil potuisse
praeter Dei ordinem fieri, quia ipsum malum quod natur est, nullo modo Dei
ordine natum est; sed illa iustitia id inordinatum esse non sivit, sed in sibi
meritum ordinem redigit et compulit."
49 Contra Mendadum 7.18, 40 P.L., col. 529: '"Si quidem non solum
ipsum furtum, verum etiam falsum testimonium, et adulterium, et omne opus
malum non erit malum, sed bonum . . . quis ita dicat, nisi qui res humanas
omnesque conatur mores legesque subvertere?"
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derlying this order: "Sin is, therefore, any deed or word or
desire which is contrary to the lex aeterna ... and illicit is
whatever this law prohibits. . . 2" 5" St. Augustine stresses
in particular the fact that God detests evil or sin, because it
disturbs the divinely ordained universal order, that is, the
lex aeterna "which commands us to observe the natural or-
der, and forbids us to disturb it." 'I For God loves this or-
der which comprises 5 both good and evil: "For who would
dare to deny, 0 Lord, that Thou governest everything in a
most orderly manner?" "'
The lex aeterna, which as the universal order also con-
stitutes the ratio aeterna of all that is created,5" resides in
every creature in a germinating manner.5 In other words,
the ratio aeterna exists in every creature in the form of a
ratio seminaria or ratio seminalis. This ratio aeterna becomes
manifest in all created things, and does so in the form of
"laws" which, in the final analysis, constitute the "inner
nature" of these things. The ratio aeterna, or lex aeterna,
reveals itself in every creature in form of the ex naturalis.
St. Augustine explains this relationship of the universal or-
der and the "inner order" of each individual thing or crea-
ture in the following way: "The lex aeterna becomes mani-
fest in and through laws which are in full accord with this
50 Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22.27, 42 P.L., col. 418: "Ergo peccatum
est, factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem." Id. at
22.28, 42 P.L., col. 419: "Est autem illicitum, quod lex illa [scil., aeternal pro-
hibet. . . ." Cf. De musica 6.11.30, 32 P.L., col. 1180: "Ut qui legem agere
noluit, a lege agatur." Epistola 140.2.4, 33 P.L., col. 539: "Qui enim iniuste
se ordinat in peccatis, juste ordinatur in poenis."
51 Contra Faustum Manichaeum 22.27, 42 P.L., col. 418, quoted in note
32 supra.
52 St. Augustine might be here under the influence of 1 Corinthians 14.33:
"For God is not the author of confusion, but of peace. . . . " Cf. St. Matthew
5.45: "For He [God] maketh His sun rise on the evil and on the good, and
sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."
53 De ordine 1.5.14, 32 P.L., col. 984: "Quis neget, magnus Deus, inquit,
te cuncta ordine administrare." Cf. CIcERo, DE LEGIBUS 2.4.10.
54 De ordine 1.10.28, 32 P.L., col. 991: "Ordo est . . . per quem aguntur
omnia quae Deus constituit." Cf. CicFRo, DE NATURA DEoRUus 2.38.97; 2.40.101.
55 In -this fashion St. Augustine combines Plato's doctrine of the transcen-
dental Ideas and the Stoic notion of the immanent "logos." Cf. Mymma, DiE
GESCuICHTE DER LEHRE VON DEN KEIMKRAEFTEN 108 (1914).
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admirable universal administration [lex aeterna]. And
through these laws God knew how to order the creatures." 58
And in another place he points out that "the lex aeterna and
the ratio aeterna exist in the divine intellect; and these
direct all things to their proper end through consonant
media." " The inner order of the universe, that is to say,
the lex aeterna and the ratio aeterna, becomes manifest in
the rationes seminales or rationes seminaria which are "in"
the individual things. And these rationes seminales, these
"seminal forms" or "germinating principles," constitute the
"natural order" or nature of each and every individual crea-
ture. They are an essential part of the eternal plan by which
the Divine Wisdom governs58 the universe: "The Verbum
Dei contains the rationes aeternae of everything that has
been generated in time; and in Him is everything that has
been created through the Verbum." 19 The Verbum Dei is
the eternal cause not only of the universal order, but also
of the "individual order" of every species and individual
thing.
Aside from the lex aeterna, ratio aeterna or universal or-
der, St. Augustine also speaks of a summum bonum, an ipse
bonum or incommutabile bonum through which everything
56 De catechizandis rudibus 18.30, 40 P.L., col. 333: "Novit enim Deus
ordinare .. . inferiores partes creaturae suae convenientissimis et congruentissimis
legibus admirandae dispositionis ornare."
57 De libero arbitrio 1.5.11-1.7.17, 32 P.L., col. 1227-1231. Cf. CICERo,
Da NATURA DEORUm 1.6.19; DE LEG Us 2.4.25: "Lex est ratio summi Jovis....";
id. at 1.6.
58 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2,21, 34 P.L., col 602: "Insunt enim
corporeis rebus per omnia elementa mundi quaedam occultae seminariae rationes,
quibus cum data fuerit opportunitas temporalis atque causalis, prorumpunt in
species debitas suis modis et finibus . . . Deus vero solus verus creator est,
qui causas ipsas et rationes seminarias rebus inseruit." Cf. De genesi ad litteram
10.20.35-36, 34 P.L., col. 424; id. at 10.21.37, 34 P.L., col. 425; id. at 4.33.51,
34 P.L., col. 318; De Trinitate 3.8.13, 42 P.L., col. 875: ". . . occulta quaedam
semina in istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent." See also CICERo, DE
NATURA DEORUm 2.39; 2.34; 2.33.
59 De genesi ad litteram 4.24.41, 34 P.L., col. 315: "... in ipso Verbo
Dei . . . in quo sunt omnium, etiam quae temporaliter facta sunt, aeternae
rationes, tamquam in eo per quod facta sunt omnia." Cf. De civitate Dei 5.11,
41 P. L., col. 153; CICERo, DE NATURA EORUm 31.80.
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that is created becomes good."° We might even say that with
St. Augustine the full realization of this summum bonum
constitutes the necessary prerequisite for a rational under-
standing of the meaning of "the good." It has already been
pointed out that the lex aeterna is the "inner order" of all
creation. But everything that is orderly - in other words,
everything that complies with the lex aeterna and the uni-
versal order for which it stands - is at the same time
"good" or "a good." The highest concept of the most per-
fect orderliness, the lex aeterna, is therefore declaratory of
the summum bonum, that is, of God. This summum bonum
is not only the source of all that is good and true, but con-
stitutes itself the bonum omni boni and the veritas omni
veritatis. Only through the summum bonum can any crea-
ture be called good,6 and in God the summum bonum and
the lex aeterna are one and the same thing."
The moral significance of man's actions and volitions is
not to be found in the "individual freedom" of these actions
or volitions, but in the ultimate determination of man's con-
duct by the lex aeterna as well as by the realization of the
summum bonum, that is, in man's complete submission to
the eternal order, which is declaratory of the summum
bonum. Thus in his definition of the summum bonum and,
incidentally, of the lex aeterna, St. Augustine also upholds
what the later Middle Ages would have called the perseitas
boni, the absolute and objective nature of all basic moral
norms or laws.6
60 Cf. De Trinitate 8.5.8, 42 P.L., col. 953; id. at 13.9.12, 42 P.L., col.
1023; id. at 14.18.24, 42 P.L., col. 1055; Confessions 1.1, 32 P.L., col. 661;
De quantitate animae 33.70 ff., 32 PJ,., col. 1075-77. Thus it might be said that
with St. Augustine ethics is in fact a doctrine of the highest good, a view which
he inherited from antiquity.
61 De Trinitate 8.3-4, 42 P.L., col. 949-52.
62 De vera religione 11.21, 34 P.L., col. 131; De libero arbitrio 2.9.26,
32 PJ., col. 1254; De Trinitate 14.15.21, 42 P.L., col. 1051-52. Cf. CrcEo,
DE LEraaus 1.17: "Ipsum enim bonum non est opinionibus, sed natura." Id.
at 1.16.
63 Cf. Contra Mendacium 7.18, 40 P.L., col. 529, quoted in note 49 supra.
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The lex naturalis, according to St. Augustine, is the con-
scious participation of rational man in the lex aeterna. By
lex naturalis he understands, above all, the lex rationis or
"law of reason." " This lex rationis is, however, but one
aspect of the "general law of nature" which, as regards ra-
tional and moral man, signifies above all the lex naturalis
moralis addressed to rational and moral man. The lex natur-
alis moralis or lex naturalis is imprinted or impressed on
man's soul or heart, and is thus the imprint of the lex
aeterna on his rational soul. To state it differently, the ex
aeterna is the objective and absolute apriori of everything
that might be called morally good, while the lex naturalis
(moralis) signifies the "subjective" moral apriori, that is,
the form in which the objective, infinite and absolute moral
apriori, the lex aeterna, can be apprehended by rational
man. "The lex naturalis is . . . transcribed on the rational
soul of man"; 65 and it "is also in the reason of man, because
he already makes use of his free will; and it is written into
his heart in a most natural manner." 66
The fundamental precepts of the lex naturalis are known
to all men capable of right reasoning, no matter how de-
praved they may be, because God, Who wrote the lex natur-
alis into the hearts of men, speaks to everyone. Hence no
one, not even the heathens, can plead ignorance of the ex
naturalis. Their moral conscience, which can never be
silenced, is their law." Thus everyone, believer as well as
64 Epistola 157.3.18, 33 P.L., col. 683.
65 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaest. 53.2, 40 P.L., col. 36:
. . transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem. . . ." De libero
arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229. Cf. CIcERo, Da LEGcaus 1.10.30: "Quaequae
in animis imprimuntur, de quibus ante dixit, inchoata intelligentiae, similiter in
omnibus imprimuntur, interpresque mentis oratio verbis discrepat, sententiis
congruens." DE lUiBus BONORUM ET mALORumTh 5.21.59; Dx REPUBLICA 3.20.
See also ST. THoxws AQsUINAS, SUImwnA THEOL. II, quaest. 93, art. 2.
66 Epistola 157.3.15, 33 P.L., col. 681: " . . . lex est etiam in ratione
hominis qui iam utitur arbitrio libertatis, naturaliter in corde conscripta... ."
Cf. De spiritu et littera 21.36, 44 P1,., col. 222; id. at 17.30, 44 P.1., col. 219;
id. at 26.44, 44 P.L., col. 227; id. at 26.46, 44 P.L., col. 229.
67 De sermone Dei in monte 2.9.32, 34 P.L., col. 1283: "Nam quando illi
valent intellegere, nullum esse animam, quamvis perversam, quae tamen ullo modo
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unbeliever, is called upon by his moral conscience to recog-
nize the existence of the lex naturalis. Hence even the
heathens have devised a number of most useful moral pre-
cepts. These precepts are, in turn, the result of the working
of the Divine Providence which permeates everything, in-
cluding the unbeliever."' The lex naturauis is also called the
lex intima, because it is written into the innermost heart of.
man. Through his commandments, God calls men back to
the lex naturalis which they try so often to escape.6" The
rational soul, illuminated by the Divine Light and through
the proper use of its natural reason, counsels itself in moral
matters, for the soul can read in itself that which it ought
to do and ought not to do.70 This is the reason why even the
godless think of eternity, and why they often praise or con-
demn correctly certain mores.7' In no man, no matter how
depraved he may be morally, has the image of God been
blurred by vice to such an extent that he can no longer dis-
tinguish at least the general contours of the lex naturalis.72
ratiocinari potest, in cuius conscientia non loquatur Deus? Quis enim scripsit
in cordibus hominum naturalem legem, nisi Deus?" St. Augustine refers here to
St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans 2.14-15.
68 De- doctrina Christiana 2.40.60, 34 P.L., col. 63: "Sed de quibusdam
quasi metallis divinae providentiae, quae ubique infusa est, eruerunt [sci.,
ethuici .... "
69 Enarratia in psalmum 57.1, 36 P.L., col. 673: "Data est enim conscripta
lex: non quia in cordibus scripta non erat; sed quia tu fugitivus eras cordis tui,
ab ilo qui ubique est comprehenderis, et ad teipsum intro revocaris. Propterea
scripta lex quid clamat eis qui des6ruerunt legem scriptam in cordibus suis?
Redite praevaricatores ad cor."
70 Enarratia in psalmum 145.5, 37 P.L., col. 1887-88: "Consilium sibi ex
luce Dei dat ipsa anima per rationalem mentem, unde concipit consilium fixum
in aeternitate auctoris sui. Legit ibi quiddam tremendum, laudandum, amandum,
desiderandum et appetendum."
71 De Trinitate 14.15.21, 42 P.L., col. 1052: "Nam . . . etiam impii cogitant
ae'ternitatem, et multa recte reprehendunt recteque laudant in hominum moribus.
. . . Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae? . . .Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in
libro lucis illius quae veritas dicitur? unde omnis lex iusta describitur, et in cor
hominis qui operatur iustitiam, non migrando, sed tamquam imprimendo trans-
fertur; sicut imago ex annulo in ceram transit, et annulum non relinquit."
72 De spiritu et littera 28.48, 44 P.L., col. 230: "Verumtamen quia non usque
adeo in anima humana imago Dei terrenorum affectifum labe detrita est, ut
nuila in ea velut lineamenta extrema remanserint, unde merito dici possit etiam
in ipsa impietate vitae suae facere aliqua legis vel sapere. . . ." Cf. Epistola
157.3.15-21, 33 P.L., col. 681-5, where we are told that the lex naturalis is a lex
rationis which cannot be deleted even by iniquity.
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But in the hearts of the just and pure, the voice of the lex
aeterna always remains most articulate,"' and the just and
pure of heart listen to this voice and thus know what they
may do and what they may not do.74
Thus we find within ourselves the basic norms or precepts
of the lex naturalis, and with them the fundamental prin-
ciple of justice. According to St. Augustine, the principle of
Natural Justice "is a habit of the rational soul... which ren-
ders everyone his proper dignity [or due], but which in do-
ing so, always considers the principle of common useful-
ness." 75 In its true nature, justice, or for that matter, law
(ius) as such, "cannot be the result of mere personal opin-
ion, but must be something which is implanted in man by a
certain innate power." 11 Hence, as. regards the rational
soul, the principle of justice is something as self-evident as
the lex aeterna or the lex naturalis, and not even the great-
73 De vera religione 31.58, 34 P.L., col. 148: "Aeternam igitur legem
mundis animis fas est cognoscere, iudicare non fas est." Cf. Sermo de Scripturis
81.2, 38 P.1., col. 500: "... manebat adhuc lex aeterna in cordibus piorum.
74 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2.67, 34 P.1., col. 618: " . . . lex Dei
quam consulunt omnes piae mentes, ut quod in ea invenerint, vel faciant, vel
iubeant, vel vetent, secundum quod ilia incommutabili veritate praeceperit."
75 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaest. 31.1, 40 P.L., col. 20:
"lustitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate conservata, suam cuique tribuens
dignitatem." St. Augustine then continues: "Eius initium est ab natura pro-
fectum: deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione venerunt: postea
res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas, legum metus et religio
sanxit." It should be noted here that "justice" is defined in the Digest of Jus-
tinian, DiEsT 1.1, de iustitia et iure 10 (Ulpian lib. 1 regularum), and the
Institutes, INSTITUTEs 1.1, de iustitia et iure, as follows: "iustitia est constans
et perpetua voluntas !us suum cuique tribuens." Compare Cicero, from whom
St. Augustine probably borrowed his definition, CIcERO, RHETO ICA (DE INVEN-
TIoNE) 2.160: "Justice is a habit of the soul [habitus animi] which . .. renders
to every one his dignity"; DE riumus 5.23: "[Iustitia dicitur] . . . animi
affectio suum cuique tribuens"; Ai) EmuENNm 3.3 (authorship doubtful): "Ius-
titia est aequitas, ius cuique tribuens pro dignitate cuiusque." The Roman
jurisconsults, cf. ULriaw, REGULARUM LIBRI vir, 1.10, translated the essentially
Stoic nomenclature of Cicero into legal terminology. Thus the Ciceronean "habitus
animi," DE ixvENTIoNE 2.160, or the "animi affectio," Da Pininus 5.23, becomes
with Ulpian the "constans et perpetua voluntas"; and the Ciceronean "dignitas,"
RIEToaicA 2.160; AD HERENNIUm 3.3, a "ius."
76 De diversi& quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaest. 31.1, 40 P.L., col. 20:
"Natura ius est, quod non opinio genuit, sed quaedam innata vis inseruit." Cf.
CrCERO, DE Lromius 2.4.8.
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est malefactor can ever lose it completely." Through the
light of natural reason, we are aware of the existence of this
principle, and with it of the lex naturalis, while our moral
conscience always reminds us of the lex aeterna, which is at
the bottom both of the lex naturalis and the principle of
Natural Justice." Natural Justice represents above all a real-
ization of the universal order decreed by God and the ra-
tional compliance with it. Injustice is, therefore, the absence
of a right conception of this universal order. Like everything
evil, injustice is the lack of concord in the manifold rela-
tions of the various creatures to one another as well as in
the relation of these creatures to God. It is, in other words,
man's willful disturbance of the universal and divinely or-
dained order, which the lex aeterna expressly forbids. 9
What then, may we ask, is the content of the lex naturalis?
We have already been told that Natural Justice consists in
rendering everyone his due, the snum cuique tribuere, and
that it must always refer to the common good or common
utility. For reasons of the common good or common utility,
certain aspects of the principle of Natural Justice, and hence
also of the lex naturalis, turn in the course of history into
custom and social tradition, until finally this principle of
Natural Justice is sanctioned both by religion and fear of the
law.80 But we have still to ascertain what, according to St.
Augustine's formula of Natural Justice, constitutes "every-
one's own or due [suum]." S In order to define and explain
77 De Trinitate 14.15.21, 42 PFI., col. 1051-52; id. at 12.15.24-25, .42 P.L.,
col. 1011-12. Like the lex naturalis, so. also the iustitia-this "habitus animi"-
is imprinted on the souls of men, an "imprint" which not even the worst
iniquity can ever erase. Cf. Confessions 2.4.9, 32 P.L., col. 678; Epistola 157,
33 P.L., col. 674-93.
78 De Trinitate 12.15.21, 42 P.L., col. 1051-52.
79 Contra Fai-stum Maniclhaeum 22.27, 42 P1., col. 418 et seq., quoted
in note 32 supra.
80 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, "quaest. 31.1, 40 P.L., col. 20:
"Iustitia . . . deinde quaedam in consuetudiner ex utilitatis ratione venerunt:
postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas, legum metus et
religio sanxit."
81 De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, quaest. 31.1, 40 P.L., col. 20, quoted
in note 75 supra.
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the nature of this "suum" more precisely, St. Augustine once
more refers to the natural, that is, ontological order of
things to which all creatures are subjected. Natural Justice
is, then, whatever contributes to the greatest possible order-
liness - to the maintenance of the most perfect order as it
is ordained by God Himself.8 In other words, the observa-
tion as well as the actualization of this sublime order is the
ultimate significance of the Augustinian concept of Natural
Justice:83
God ordered and made everything ...and He ordered
the whole of creation after the manner of certain degrees or
steps, proceeding from the earth to the heavens; from the
visible to the invisible; and from the mortal to the immortal.
This harmonious interrelation or interaction of the whole
of creation - this most orderly beauty, ascends from the
lowliest to the most sublime and, at the same time, descends
from the most sublime to the lowliest. Nowhere is this har-
monious interrelation disrupted, for despite all its dissimili-
tudes, it always remains perfectly balanced. And this sub-
lime orderly beauty in its entirety praises God.
In conformity with the idea that Natural Justice is essen-
tially the observance of the divinely ordained order by ren-
dering to everyone his due, St. Augustine declares that the
rule, "do nothing unto another you would not have done un-
to yourself," constitutes a second definition of the basic
meaning or content of the lex naturalis and Natural Justice:
"The lex naturalis, which is by nature inscribed on the
hearts of men, is also in the intellect of man who already
makes use of his free will. And this Raw tells man that he
82 De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229: "Ut igitur . . . legis
notionem, quae impressa nobis rest, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est qua
iustum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima." Cf. Enarratio in psalmum 145.5, 37 P.L.,
col 1887-88, quoted in note 70 supra. See also CIcERo, Dx os cns 1.4.14.
83 Enarratio in Psalmum 144.13, 37 P.L., col. 1878: "Deus ordinavit onnia,
et fecit omnia . . . et gradibus quibusdam ordinavit creaturam, a terra usque
ad coelum, a visibilibus ad invisibilia, a mortalibus ad immortalia. Ista con-
textio creaturae, ista ordinatissima pulchritudo, ab imis ad summa conscendens,
a summis ad ima descendens, nusquam interrupta, sed dissimilibus temperata,
tota laudet Deum." Cf. De civitate Dei 19.12.3, 41 P.L., col. 640: "Nullo modo
tamen inde aliquid legibus summi i11ius Creatoris Ordinatorisque subtrahitur, a
quo pax universitatis administratur."
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should do nothing unto another he would not have done un-
to himself." 84 Thus in all our dealings with our fellow men
we must always observe the Golden Rule which, according
to St. Augustine, constitutes the "practical" aspect of the
basic principle or precept of Natural Law and Natural Jus-
tice.85 The two moral precepts, namely, to render to every-
one his due, and to do nothing unto another you would not
have done unto yourself, are therefore for St. Augustine
what St. Thomas Aquinas later called the primary principles
of Natural Law. 6 Every other precept of Natural Law is es-
sentially nothing but a conclusion from these first two prin-
ciples.
According to St. Augustine, the lex aeterna is also the im-
mutable norm or standard of all human or temporal laws.
Hence nothing may be called lawful or just in a moral sense
which is not derived from the lex aeterna, the source of all
lawfulness and justice." A good and wise lawgiver, there-
fore, will always shape his laws after the lex aeterna, the
absolute and eternal, model of all that might be called law-
ful and just. It is the lex aeterna which suggests to the good
lawmaker what, in the light of local and temporal circum-
stances, he may command and what he may prohibit.88 All
84 Epistola 157.3.15, 33 P.., col. 681: "Lex est etiam in ratione hominis,
qui Jam utitur arbitrio libertatis, naturaliter in corde conscripta, qua suggeritur,
ne aliquid faciat quisque alteri, quod pati ipse non vult." Cf. De ordine 2.8.25,
32 P.L., col. 1006: "In omni vero contractu atque conversatione cur hominibus,
satis est servare unum hoc vulgare proverbium: Nemini faciant quod pati
nolunt." Enarratio in Psalmum 118, sermo 25.4, 37 P.L., col. 1574; De doctrina
Chrisktiana 3.14.22, 34 P.., col. 74.
85 De ordine 2.8.25, 32 P.L., co]. 1006, quoted in note 84 supra.
86 ST. THo.As, SSua TnxoL. 1.11, quaest. 94, art. 2 and art. 4.
87 De Nlbero arbitrio -1.6.15, 32 P.,., col. 1229: "Simul etiam te videre
arbitror in illa temporali [scil, lege] nihil iustum atque legitimum, quod non
ex hac aeterna [scil., lege] sibi homines derivarint: nam si populus file quodam
tempore iuste honores dedit, quodam rursus iuste non dedit; haec vicissitudo
temporalis, ut iusta esset, ex ila aeternitate tracta est, qua semper iustum est
gravem populum honores dare, levem non dare .. . Cum ergo haec sit una lex,
ex qua illae omnes temporales [soil., leges] ad homines regendos variantur, num
ideo ipsa variari ullo modo potest?" Cf. De civitate Dei 19.21.1, 41 P.L., col. 649.
88 De vera religione 31.58, 34 P1.., col. 148: "Conditor tamen legum tem-
poralium, si vir bonus est et sapiens, illam ipsam consulit [scil., legem] aeternam,
de ,qua nulli animae iudicare datum est; ut secundum elus incommutabiles
regulas, quid sit pro tempore iubendum vetandumque discernat."
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human laws which are not derived from, or sanctioned by
the lex aeterna are unjust laws, and in principle we should
refrain from abiding by such unjust laws.89
Temporal or human laws, at least just human laws, are
above all images of the lex aeterna. Although these temporal
laws devised to govern men are many and varied, the one
single law or norm from which they are derived, that is to
say, from which they receive their authoritative nature, is
eternally immutable." We may ask here the question: why
should the human race stand in need of temporal laws, par-
ticularly since all men, as rational creatures, not only have
the lex naturalis implanted in, or imprinted on their hearts
or souls, but also are, through their naturalis ratio, capable
of drawing proper inferences from the first principles or pre-
cepts of the lex naturalis? St. Augustine, fully prepared to
meet this particular issue, points out that originally the law
- the Natural Law - was not written down. Since it was in-
fused into man's nature by God Himself and hence known
to all, there was no need for a written law, a ex formata in
literis, that is, a human or temporal law. But later, because
of man's evil inclinations and vices, the lex aeterna and the
lex naturalis gradually became "obscured" in the minds of
men and its knowledge extremely vague. Thus is also (lost
its hold over the hearts of men. In other words, with the
fall of man and man's subsequent wickedness, the human or
temporal law became a necessity. The temporal law or laws
had to be proclaimed by man to man in order that there
might be again a moral or legal authority. And with the
89 Epistola 105.2.7, 33 P.L., col. 398: "Imperatores enim si in errore essent
... pro errore suo contra veritatem leges darent . . . non faciendo quod li
iuberent, quia Deus prohiberet." Obviously, this passage is under the influence
of St. Matthew 22.21: "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and
unto God the things which are God's."
90 De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229: "Cum ergo haec sit una
lex, ex qua illae omnes temporales [scil., Ieges] ad homines regendos variantur,
num ideo ipsa variari ullo modo potest?" Cf. CicEao, DE LEcraus 1.6: "Con-
stituendi vero iuris ab ila summa lege capiamus exordium, quae seculis omnibus
ante nata est, quam scripta lex ulla, aut quam omnino civitas constituta." Id.
at 2.4.25.
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promulgation of the temporal law, that is, the just temporal
law, the lex naturalis, which gradually had been obscured
through sin and evil deeds, once more becomes manifest and
authoritative.9
Since man is what he is, particularly after his fall, neither
the lex aeterna nor the lex naturalis makes the human or
temporal law superfluous. On the contrary, St. Augustine
himself asserts that the lex naturalis, in order to actualize it-
self more fully in history, stands in need of the human or
temporal law.92 The plurality and diversity of the different
positive legal systems which we encounter in history, as well
as the many historical changes within one and the same legal
system are, however, no proof against the singleness and
immutability of the lex aeterna and the lex naturalis9 3
Neither do they disprove the fact that all human laws -
the just human laws at least - are derived from the single
lex aeterna and lex naturalis. The human law or laws, to be
sure, ignore and even tolerate many things prohibited by
the lex aeterna and the lex naturalis.94 Although this is a
most regrettable situation, St. AuguStine points out quite
realistically that the human or temporal laws do not con-
cern themselves primarily with the promotion of virtue and
the virtuous life, but are primarily intended to preserve
peace and order by preventing or punishing the worst abuses
and the crudest maladjustments which might endanger this
91 Epistola 157.3.15, 33 P.L., col. 681; De vera religione 31.58, 34 P.L.,
col. 148; Sermo 125.2, 38 P.L., col. 689; Sermo 154.1, 38 P.L., col. 833; Sermto
155.3.3, 38 P.L., col. 842; Sermo 156.2.2, 38 P.1., col. 850-51; Sermo 170.1.1,
38 P1,., col. 927; Contra Faustum Manichaeum 19.7, 42 P.L., col. 351.
92 De vera religione 31.58, 34 P.L., col. 148.
93 De doctrina Christiana 3.14.22, 34 P.L., col. 74: "Qua varietate innu-
merabilium consuetudinum commoti quidam dormitantes, ut ita dicam . . .
putaverunt nullam esse iustitiam per seipsam, sed unicuique genti consuetudinem
suam iustam videri: quae cum sit diversa omnibus gentibus, debeat autem in-
commutabilis manere iustitia, fieri manifestum nullam usquam esse iustitiam.
Non intellexerunt, ne multa commemorem, quod tibi fieri non vis, alii ne feceris,
. . .nullo modo posse uUa eorum gentili diversitate variari." Cf. De libero
arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229; De civitate Dei 19.17, 41 P.L., col. 646.
94 De civitate Dei 15.16.2, 41 P.L., col. 459; De libero arbitrio 1.5.13, 32 P.L.,
col. 1228; id. at 1.5.14-16, 32 P.L., col. 1228-29.
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peace.95 For it is of the essence of the temporal legal order to
preserve civil peace and to secure through this peace the
harmonious existence and maintenance of secular society.
9 6
According to St. Augustine, the State is "a multitude of
human or rational beings bound together by a certain social
tie," that is, by the bonds of concord, and subject to one and
the same laws." He defines the idea of social order under
the rule of law as "that disposition which assigns to equal
as well as unequal things their proper places." 98 For the ra-
tional and harmonious order of all things, including the secu-
lar State or temporal rule of law, requires not only a diver-
sity of men, but also a disparity in the treatment of different
or unlike people, "because thus did God make man." 99 A
well adjusted and properly ordered society, that is, a peace-
ful society, consists in the concord of all citizens in which
95 De libero arbitrio 1.5.13, 32 P.L., col. 1228: "Videtur enim tibi lex ista,
quae regendis civitatibus fertur, multa concedere atque impunite relinquere, quae
per divinam tamen providentiam vindicantur; et recte. Neque enim quia non
omnia facit, ideo quae facit improbanda sunt." Cf. Epistola 153.6.26, 33 P.L.,
col. 665: ". . . iura . . . civilia . . . non quid hinc fiat, ut bene utentes sint,
sed ut male utentes minus molesti sint' Ibid: "Si quae leges [sc., temporales]
adversus vos constitutae sunt, non eis bene facere cogimini, sed male facere
prohibimini."
96 De libero arbitrio 1.15.31 ff., 32 P1., col. 1257-58; De civitate Dci
19.14, 41 P.L., col. 642; id. at 19.17, 41 P.L., col. 645.
97 De civitate Dci 15.8.2, 41 P.L., col. 447: ". . . dvitas . . . nihl aliud
est quam hominum multitudo aliquo societatis vinculo colligata." Id. at 19.21.2,
41 P.., col. 649; Quaestiones X Evangeliae 2.46, 35 P.L., col. 1360: "Est enim
civitas, non quorumlibet amimantium, sed rationalium multitudo, legis unius
societate devincta." De civitate Dei 19.24, 41 P.L., col. 655: "Populus est coetus
multitudinis rationalis, rerum quas diligit concordi communione societatus." Id. at
19.17, 41 P.L., col. 645; Epistola 138.2.10, 33 P.L., col. 529: "Quid est autem
civitas, nisi multitudo hominum in quoddam vinculum redacta concordiae."
Epistola 155.3.9, 33 P.L., col. 670. " . . . cum aliud civitas non sit, quan
concors hominum multitudo." All these definitions of the State are obviously
a reflection of the influence of Cicero. CicERo, DE REPUBLICA 3.25.29.
98 De civitate Dei 19.13.1, 41 P.L., col. 640: "Ordo est parium dispariumque
rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio." This Augustinian definition may be
considered one of the truly great legacies of the ancient world, since it was to
become, through the'authority of St. Augustine, the basic tenet of all social,
legal, and political thinking of the Middle Ages. Cf. Chroust, The Function of
Law and Justice in the Ancient World and the Middle Ages, 7 JouMWA. oF THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS 298 (1946); Chroust, The Corporate Idea and the Body
Politic in the Middle Ages, 9 RavIaw oF PoLrics 437 (1947).
99 De civitate Dei 19.15, 41 P.1., co]. 643. Cf. in general, Id. at 19.14-19.16,
41 P.L., col. 642-45.
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the power or right to rule and the duty to obey are perfect-
ly balanced.' For it is obvious that "it is good for some to
serve or obey in particular, while it is good for all to serve
God in general." 101
The civitas Dei as well as the secular or political State
both exist side by side in. this world. They must collaborate
in many ways." 2 Both are confronted with similar problems,
and both have to combat similar evils. 3 The universal peace
and order maintained and secured by the secular State is of
the greaterest importance to the civitas Dei and its ultimate
achievement on earth.
The laws of the secular State, like all human or temporal
laws, find their ultimate justification in 'the lex aeterna and
the lex naturalis. The purpose of the secular State is to sub-
ject a multitude of men to one single and uniform legal or-
der so that peace may reign among them. So far as this
legal or political order does not contradict the express com-
mands of God, that is to say, so far as it is in conformity with
the lex aeterna and the lex naturalis, it rests upon divine
ordination 104 in that it serves the maintenance of universal
peace and order and thus is itself part of the universal order
and harmony expressed by the lex aeterna. But "there is
nothing in the temporal law that could be called just or
legitimate, unless the citizens derived it from the lex aeter-
na." 10 5 Hence we should ignore in principle all those human
laws which do not flow from this eternal "fountain of all
justice." In other words, the lawgiver has to promulgate the
100 De civitate Dei 19.13.1, 41 P.L., col. 640: "Ordinata imperandi obedi-
endique concordia civium." Id. at 19.16, 41 PL., col. 645; 19.7, 41 PL., col.
643; 18.2.1, 41 P.L., coL 559: "Societas . . . mortalium diffusa [scil., per terras
et in locorum quantislibet diversitatibus], unius tamen eiusdem naturae quadam
communione devincta. ... "
101 De civitate Dci 19.21.2, 41 PJ., col. 649: "... quibusdam ese utilem
servitutem; et Deo quidem ut serviatur, utile est omnibus." Cf. Id. at 19.16,
41 pL., col. 644.
102 De civitate Dei 19.17, 41 PL., col. 645-46; id. at 19.4, 41 P.L., col. 642.
103 Cf. De civitate Dei 15.2, 41 P.L., col. 439; id. at 18.54.2, 41 P.L., col.
620; id. at 18.2.1, 41 PL., col. 559.
104 De civitate Dei 19.14, 41 PL., col. 642-43.
105 De libero arbitrio 1.6.15, 32 P.L., col. 1229, quoted in note 87 supra.
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temporal law or temporal laws "according to immutable
norms; and according to these eternal rules he has also to
determine what for the time being should be commanded,
and what should be forbidden." 106
The very foundaltion of the legal and political order rests
on the natural, divinely ordained and instituted order of all
things. Within this universal order, God has endowed man
with an intellect as well as a social nature. It is this intelli-
gent and social nature of man which compels him to form,
or enter into unions such as the family or the secular
State.' Thus the intelligent and social nature of man is at
the basis of all social institutions, and for this very reason
the individual always remains the basic and essential ele-
ment 108 of every secular State: "In the same manner as the
single letter is the basic element of a phrase, so the individ-
ual is the fundamental constituent of the State." 109 The
natural social "disposition" of intelligent man, in other
words, the law of nature itself, induces or forces man to en-
ter into associations with other men in order to maintain
peace and thus promote the universal harmony exemplified
in the lex aeterna.11° For, as St. Augustine says, nothing is
as "socially minded" as the human race which through sin
and evil inclinations suddenly finds itself torn asunder by
strife and mutual hatred."' Thus by their very natures men
106 Quaestiones in Heptateuchum 2.67, 34 P.L., col. 618, quoted in note 74
supra. Cf. De vera religione 31.58, 34 P.I., col. 148.
107 De civitate Dei 19.12.2, 41 P.L., col. 639: "Quando magis homo fertur
quodammodo naturae suae legibus ad ineundum societatem paceraque cur homini-
bus, quantum in ipso est, ommbus obtinendum, cum etiam mali pro suorum pace
belligerent." Cf. CicFno, DE REPuBLiCA 1.25.39: "Ejus autem prima causa coeundi
est .. .naturalis hominum congregatio." DE YmmBus 5.23; DE omicn 2.21.
108 Enarratio in psalmum 9.8, 36 P1,., col. 121: "[Singuli homines] ....
sunt tanquam elementa et semina civitatum." Cf. CicEno, DE nmnaus 5.23.65:
"homines seminarium rei publicae." DE os'cns 1.17.54.
109 De civitate Dei 4.3, 41 P.L., col. 114: "Nam singulus quisque homo,
ut in sermone una littera, ita quasi elementum est civitatis et regal." Cf. Cicamo,
DE oFiciis 1.17.54.
110 De civitate Dei 19.12.2, 41 P.L., col. 639, quoted in note 107 supra.
111 De civitate Dei 12.27, 41 P.I., col. 376: "Nihil enim est quam hoc-
genus tam discordiosum vitio, tam sociale naturaY'
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have a natural disposition to live within legally and political-
ly organized society.112
The institution of the family is the first manifestation or
fruit of the natural social urge of intelligent man. The fam-
ily constitutes the germ cell of the secular State; it is the
smallest unit within the larger unit of the State. And as
every beginning already refers to the ultimate end, so the
domestic peace and harmony presages the peace and 'har-
mony which the secular State provides and secures. By the
same token, the authority of the parents and the duty of
the children to submit to this authority presage the lego-
political authority of the secular State over its subjects, as
well as the duty of the citizens to respect -this authority.1 '
In short, the secular State and the legal order which it rep-
resents is essentially nothing else than a natural evolution
of the same principle which is the basis for -the family and
the domestic order. Children must obey the commands of
-their parents unless their commands run contrary to the laws
of the State; and the citizens must abide by the laws of the
State unless its laws are opposed to the commands of God.1 4
This, according to St. Augustine, is the natural order of
things as ordained and commanded by God Himself; and
only in and through this order can we establish and secure
that peace and harmony which God intended for all men.
In other words, the secular State and the lego-political order
are intended to satisfy the general human desire for peace
112 Onus imperfectum contra Julianum 6.12, 45 PL., col. 1522.
113 De civitate Dei 19.16, 41 P.L., col. 644-45: "Quia igitur hominis domus
initium sive particula debet esse civitatis, omne autem initium ad aliquem sui
generis finem, et onnis pars ad universi, cuius pars est, integritatem refertur:
satis apparet esse consequens, ut ad pacem civicam pax domestica referatur,
id est, ut ordinata imperandi obediendique concordia cohabitantium referatur
ad ordinatam imperandi obediendique concordiam civium. Ita fit, ut ex lege
civitatis praecepta sumere patremfamilias oporteat, quibus domum suam sic regat,
ut sit pad accomodata civitatis."
114 Sermo 62.5.8, 38 P.L., coL 418: "Primi enim tibi sunt pater et mater:
si recte educantes, si in Christum nutrientes, audiendes; audiendi in omnibus . . .
Maior sit patria et ipsis parentibus tuis; ut quidquid iusserint parentes contra
patriam, non audiantur. Et quidquid iusserit patria contra Deum, non audiatur."
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and to accomplish at the same time the Will of God, Who
wants us to live in peace and harmony with one another.
The secular State, therefore, must prevent above all any
disturbance of the existing, -that is, natural order of things," 5
but without attempting to remedy every injustice which
might exist." 6 As has already -been pointed out, it is of the
essence of the human or temporal law, and hence also of the
secular State, to prevent only the worst excesses and to re-
strain only the greatest evildoers. Hence the secular State
enacts certain temporal laws, not in order to make its citi-
zens virtuous or pious men, but solely to deter the worst
malefactors." 7 Human law is made by human beings, al-
though after the model of the le aeterna or the lex natural-
is; as such it is primarily an instrument for the control of
the secular affairs of man." 8 Through human laws, the secu-
lar State guarantees -the maintenance of human society and
the social institutions of man." 9
The peace, harmony and order which the secular State
guarantees is an essential part of the universal peace and
harmonious order decreed by God Himself. The true peace
of every individual human being consists in his submission
to the universal order or lex aeterna, in other words, to the
Will of God:
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The peace of secular man in particular, on the other hand,
consists in the harmonious and orderly concord of all human
beings within a legally and politically organized society. The
domestic peace, finally, consists in the orderly harmony and
115 De doctrina Christiana 2.25.40, 34 P.L., col. 55: "Sed haec tota pars
humanorum institutorum, quae ad usum vitae necessarium proficiunt, nequaquam
est fugienda christiano." Id. at 2.39.58, 34 P1L., col. 62: "lla vero instituta
hominum, quae ad societatem conviventium valent, pro ipsa huius vitae necessi-
tate non negligant." Cf. De dvitate Dci 19.21.2, 41 P.L., col. 649; Epistola
153.6.16, 33 P.L., col. 660.
116 Epistola 153.6.26, 33 P.L., col. 665, quoted in note 95 supra.
117 Epistola 153.6.26, 33 P.L., col. 665, quoted in note 95 supra.
118 De civitate Dei 15.16.2, 41 P.L., coL 459.
119 De libero arbitrio 1.15.32, 32 P.L., col. 1238. Cf. Id. at 1.15.33, 32 P.L.,
col. 1239.
120 De civitate Dei 19.13.1, 41 P.L., col. 640: "Pax horninis nortalis et
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
balance that exists between the right to command and the
duty to obey, a balance which must exist among those who
live in very close associations. The peace of politically and
legally organized society, again, consists in the proper and
orderly distribution of ruler and ruled among the citizens.
And all this is ordained by God, "the Creator of all things,
Who is at the same time the wisest and most just of all or-
derers." 121 In this fashion St. Augustine relates to God, -the
wisest Creator and most just Administrator of all things,
the temporal law and the secular State which protect and se-
cure all human institutions. He also derives directly from
the Divine Will the right .to command and the duty to obey,
as well as the distribution of these rights and duties, since,
according to St. Augustine, "there is no power but of
God." 122 And in another place he. states quite definitely that
"the eternal truth proclaims its commands through the
heart of the king; and if the rulers command what is good,
then no one else speaks through them than Christ." 123 Even
the power of the tyrant is from God, because God gives pow-
er both to good and evil rulers, according to His Will.124 The
many kingdoms and empires have actually been founded by
Divine Providence, 12 since we cannot assume that God, the
Creator of the universal order, intended to exempt from His
Dei immortalis, ordinata in fide sub aetema lege obedientia. Pax hominum,
ordinata concordia. Pax domus, ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia
cohabitantium. Pax civitatis, ordinata imperandi atque obediendi concordia
civium ... Pax omnium rerum, tranquillitas ordinis."
121 De civitate Dei 19.13.2, 41 P1,., col. 641: "Deus Escil., est] ergo
naturarum omnium sapientissimus Conditor et iustissimus Oidinator."
122 Epistola 93.6.20, 33 PL., col. 331.
123 Epistola 105.3.11, 33 P.L., col. 400: "Hoc iubent imperatores, quod
iubet et Christus; quia cum bonum itrbent, per los non iubet nisi Christus."
Id. at 105,3.7, 33 P1,., col. 398: "... per cor regis ipsa veritas iussit."
124 De civitate Dei 5.21, 41 P.1., col 167: "Quae cum ita sint, non tribu-
amus dandi regni atque imperil potestatem, nisi Deo vero, qui 'dat felicitatem
in regno coelorum solis piis; regnum verum terrenum et pus et impiis, sicut ei
placet, cui nihil iniuste placet." Cf. Id. at 19.15, 41 P.1., col. 644: "Verum et
poenalis servitus ea lege ordinatur, quae naturalem ordinem conservari lubet,
perturbari vetat." De bono coniugale 14.16, 40 P1,., col. 384-85: "Nec vitu-
perabilis ordo regiae potestatis, si rex crudelitate tyrannica saeviat."
125 De civitate Dei 5.1, 41 P.L., col. 141: "Prorsus divina providentia
regna constituuntur humana."
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providential order the secular kingdoms. 1 26 As a matter of
fact, according to St. Augustine, God gives mankind the
whole of human or temporal laws through the mouths of
emperors and kings.127
Anton-Hermann Chroust
126 De cvitae Dei 5.21, 41 P.L, col. 167: "Nullo modo est credendus
Deus regna hominum eorumque dominationes et servitutes a suae providentiae
legibus alienas esse voluisse." Id. at 5.1, 41 P.L., col. 141. Cf. Cicnao, DE
REuiCA 3.22.
127 Tractatus in Joannis Evangelium 6.25, 35 P.L., col. 1437: "Quia ipsa
iuri humana per imperatores et reges saeculi Deus distribuit generi humano."
